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Abstract. The article discusses the development of the Gaia Hypothesis as it was defined by James Lovelock 
in the 1970s and later elaborated in his collaboration with biologist Lynn Margulis. Margulis’s research in 
symbiogenesis and her interest in Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis helped to reshape the Gaia 
theory from a first-order systems theory to second-order systems theory. In contrast to the first-order systems 
theory, which is concerned with the processes of homeostasis, second-order systems incorporate emergence, 
complexity and contingency. In this respect Latour’s and Stengers’s takes on Gaia, even defining it as an 
“outlaw” or an anti-system, can be interpreted as specific kind of systems thinking. The article also discusses 
Haraway’s interpretation of Gaia in terms of sympoiesis and argues that it presents a major reconceptualization 
of systems theory.
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Gajos teorija: tarp autopoezės ir simpoezės
Santrauka. Straipsnyje aptariama Gajos hipotezės raida, pradedant tuo, kaip Jamesas Lovelockas ją suformu-
lavo 1970 metais, ir atskleidžiant, kaip vėliau ją modifikavo bendradarbiaudamas su biologe Lynn Margulis. 
Margulis simbiogenezės teorija bei iš Humberto Maturanos ir Francisco Varelos perimta autopoezės samprata 
padėjo performuluoti Gajos hipotezę iš pirmojo lygmens sistemų teorijos į antrojo lygmens sistemų teoriją. 
Priešingai nei pirmojo lygmens sistemų teorija, kuri remiasi homeostazės principu, antrojo lygmens sistemų 
teorija inkorporuoja netikėtai pasireiškiančius, sudėtingus ir atsitiktinius elementus. Šiuo požiūriu Bruno La-
touro ir Isabelle Stengers pasiūlytos Gajos interpretacijos, net ir akcentuojančios „atskalūnišką“ ir antisisteminį 
Gajos pobūdį, vis dar gali būti aiškinamos kaip sistemų teorijos atmainos. Straipsnyje autopoezės teorija taip 
pat lyginama su Donnos Haraway pasiūlyta simpoezės samprata bei teigiama, kad būtent simpoezė leidžia 
naujai konceptualizuoti pačią sistemų teoriją. 
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Gaja, sistemų teorija, Lovelockas, Margulis, autopoezė, simpoezė 
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Introduction: The Gaia Hypothesis
Gaia theory emerged in the 1960s and expressed a very simple idea that life on Earth 
(the biota) is regulating not only the chemical composition of the air but also the climate 
to make it habitable. For a long time, Gaia theory was ridiculed as a New Age idea that 
the Earth is a living being (Lovelock 2000). However, later this hypothesis was proved 
by Lovelock and other independent researchers in many scholarly publications. Today, 
Gaia theory is a widely discussed idea which has entered philosophical discourse and 
posthumanist thinking. In recent years many important thinkers, such as Isabelle Stengers 
(2015a; 2015b), Bruno Latour (2017a; 2017b), and Donna Haraway (2016) addressed 
Gaia theory in one or another way. In my article I want to compare the novelty of their 
theoretical thinking with the original Gaia theory. Although always publicly supporting 
each other, these authors come from different backgrounds and employ different meth-
odologies. However, I argue that, regardless of their differences, these interventions can 
be read as different versions of second-order systems theory. 
The Gaia Hypothesis was formulated by the chemist James Lovelock in the 1970s 
and later significantly remodelled through Lovelock’s collaboration with biologist Lynn 
Margulis. The first insights of the Gaia Hypothesis emerged during the 1960s in a NASA 
laboratory, where Lovelock got an assignment to examine the physical and chemical 
properties of Mars and determine the planet’s suitability for life. It was noticed that Mars 
is in a chemical-physical balance which leads to a perfect equilibrium. However, Love-
lock turned the question about life on Mars upside down: he started from an obvious fact 
that there is life on Earth and that the Earth expresses a disequilibrium of atmospheric 
phenomena. Thus, if the disequilibrium of atmospheric phenomena is related to the ex-
istence of life on the Earth, then a perfect equilibrium of atmospheric processes on Mars 
leads to the conclusion that there is no life there. Later this assertion was confirmed by 
the Viking mission in 1976. But what is important for formulating the Gaia Hypothesis 
is not life on Mars but the first part of this equation – the relationship between life and 
the disequilibrium of atmospheric processes on Earth. Lovelock formulated a hypothesis 
that life on Earth is able to regulate the temperature and other planetary conditions just 
as living organisms are able to regulate their own body temperature. He asserted that 
chemical, physical, and biological processes taking place on Earth seek for a homeostasis, 
or the optimal conditions for life, that is achieved through the feedback loops operated 
automatically by the biota.
To prove this hypothesis that the Earth is able to regulate its temperature, Lovelock 
and his former student Andrew Watson developed a computer model called Daisyworld – 
a computer model of a planet, which is warmed by a sun with increasing heat. Thus the 
Daisyworld reduced the environment to the single property – temperature, and the biota – 
to one of the species, namely, daisies. The crucial question Lovelock asked himself was 
will the evolution of the Daisyworld ecosystem lead to the self-regulation of climate? 
(Harding 2014: 166). Thus as the climate warms up, black daisies appear first, because 
they absorb solar energy and increase the temperature on the planet. As the planet warms 
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up further, the black daisies disappear and white ones appear. The white daisies reflect 
the solar energy and hence cool down the temperature on the planet. Thus throughout the 
evolution of Daisyworld the temperature was kept constant: “When the sun is relatively 
cold, Daisyworld increases its own temperature through solar energy absorption by the 
black daisies; as the sun get hotter, the temperature is gradually lowered because of the 
progressive predominance of energy-reflecting white daisies. Thus Daisyworld, without 
any foresight or planning, regulates its own temperature over a vast time range by the 
dance of the daisies” (Harding 2014: 167). The purpose of this model is to demonstrate 
that feedback loops interlinking non-living and living systems (temperature and plants) 
can regulate climate and achieve the most favourable conditions. 
Lovelock formulated his hypothesis of the Earth as a self-regulating system and 
presented it for the first time in 1969 in Princeton. His friend novelist William Golding, 
the author of Lord of the Flies, suggested the name of Gaia (the Greek word for Mother 
Earth) for his theory. In 1972 Lovelock published a first paper on his theory titled “Gaia as 
Seen Through the Atmosphere” (Lovelock 1972). At the same time a microbiologist Lynn 
Margulis was working on similar questions and investigating the smallest microorganisms. 
Margulis argued that the Earth’s atmosphere is transformed by biological organisms and 
that bacteria play a crucial role here. All life is dependent on the metabolism of microbes 
which modulate the biosphere in which we live. “During the first billion years of evol-
ution bacteria – the most basic forms of life – covered the planet with an intricate web 
of metabolic processes and began to regulate the temperature and chemical composition 
of the atmosphere so that it became conducive to the evolution of higher forms of life” 
(Capra, Luisi 2014: 351). Thus Margulis helped Lovelock revise his theory and admit 
that Gaia is not a single superorganism but a symbiogenesis of a variety of organisms. In 
Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (1998), Margulis points out that “Gaia is not 
an organism. (…) Gaia, the living Earth, far transcends any single organism or even any 
population. (…) The sum of planetary life, Gaia, displays a physiology that we recognize 
as environmental regulation. Gaia itself is not an organism directly selected among many. 
It is an emergent property of interaction among organisms, the spherical planet on which 
they reside, and an energy source, the sun” (Margulis 1998: 119). Thus Gaia can be seen as 
a self-regulating system, which connects the metabolic processes of microorganisms and 
atmospheric processes of the Earth in feedback loops. As Greg Hinkle, a former student 
of Margulis, pointed out, “Gaia is just symbiosis as seen from space” (Margulis 1998: 2). 
In other words, it is a symbiosis extended to a planetary scale. 
Both Lovelock and Margulis described Gaia in terms of first-order cybernetics: Gaia is 
a self-regulating system, having the capacity to maintain its equilibrium through feedback 
loops. For example, Margulis argues that bacteria can regulate the atmosphere by removing 
some chemical elements and expelling oxygen we need to breathe. Thus Gaia is seen as 
“a genius of recycling”, because the waste produced by one species becomes the food for 
another (Margulis 1998: 121). Oxygen makes up one-fifth of the Earth’s atmosphere and, 
combined with other gases, is highly explosive. However, the ecosystem reduces these 
gases faster than they can react, thus maintaining an optimal equilibrium. As Margulis 
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points out, “the entire planetary surface, not just the living bodies but the atmosphere that 
we think of as an inert background, is so far from chemical equilibrium that the entire 
planetary surface is best regarded as alive” (Margulis 1998: 122-123). In this respect there 
is not a clean separation between the organic and the inorganic, between an organism and 
its environment, because an organism is constantly creating and changing its environment. 
However, the Gaia Hypothesis met with strong critique. Many critics have claimed that 
Gaia theory was unscientific because it was teleological. As Capra and Luisi point out, 
“the scientific establishment attacked the theory as teleological, because they could not 
imagine how life on Earth could create and regulate the conditions for its own existence 
without being conscious and purposeful” (Capra, Luisi 2014: 165). Lovelock responded 
to this critique by creating his mathematical model of Daisyworld, which we discussed 
earlier. Margulis replied to this criticism by explaining that life can simply repeat certain 
patterns as in computer algorithms. “Life produces fascinating ‘designs’ in a similar way 
by repeating the chemical cycles of its cellular growth and reproduction. Order is generated 
by nonconscious repetitious activities. Gaia, as the interweaving network of all life, is alive, 
aware, and conscious to various degrees in all its cells, bodies, and societies” (Margulis 
1998: 126). In fact, synthetic biology confirms that life is built on these repetitive patterns 
and can be reproduced artificially. Another answer to this criticism is Margulis’ notion 
of proprioception or self-awareness characteristic of living beings. “Proprioception, as 
self-awareness, evolved long before animals evolved, and long before their brains did. 
Sensitivity, awareness, and responses of plants, protocists, fungi, bacteria, and animals, 
each in its local environment, constitute the repeating pattern that ultimately underlies 
global sensitivity and the response of Gaia ‘herself’” (Margulis 1998: 126). Similar to 
organisms and animals, which are aware of themselves, Gaia also has this primary sensit-
ivity or proprioception. In this respect Margulis implicates a certain “planetary cognition” 
which indicates a move towards second-order systems theory. 
Gaia and the Theory of Autopoiesis
At the same time as Lovelock and Margulis were trying to conceptualize the Gaia the-
ory, the Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela were working on 
the theory of autopoiesis. The concept of autopoiesis was coined in the 1970s and it 
refers to the minimal organization of life, such as a cell (auto means “self” and refers to 
self-organizing systems, and poiesis means “making or creating”). The first publication 
on the theory of autopoiesis entitled “Autopoiesis: The Organization of Living Systems” 
appeared in English in 1974 (Varela, Maturana, Uribe 1974) with the help of Heinz von 
Foerster, founder of cybernetics. Autopoiesis refers to the minimal organization of a liv-
ing system, which can both maintain itself in a closed circular process of self-production 
and interact with an environment in order to get nutrients and energy. In this respect an 
autopoietic organization is defined by several features. First, it is defined by self-main-
tenance, which means that the cell’s main function is to maintain its individuality despite 
the many chemical reactions taking place in it (Maturana, Varela 1980). It also means that 
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an autopoietic entity is autonomous, capable to reproduce itself from within. In this sense 
an autopoietic organization is operationally closed. Second, an autopoietic unity interacts 
with the environment and gets information or energy from it. What distinguishes living 
systems from non-living systems is that the interaction between a living system and its 
environment creates a “structural coupling”: “a living system relates to its environment 
structurally – that is, through recurrent interactions, each of which triggers structural 
changes in the system. For example, a cell membrane continually incorporates substances 
from its environment; an organism’s nervous system changes its connectivity with every 
sensory perception” (Capra, Luisi 2014: 135). In other words, every encounter with 
the environment produces a structural change in the system which then again becomes 
autonomous. In this sense autopoietic entities are “structurally determined”, that is, they 
are determined not by external forces (as in the case of non-living systems) but by their 
own internal structure. This leads to the third characteristic of living entities – life is an 
emergent property which cannot be reduced to the properties of the components. Emer-
gence can be seen as the necessary part of self-organization.
Thus an autopoietic entity is self-maintaining and autonomous, it is structurally coupled 
with its environment and is constantly creating emergent properties that change the internal 
structure. Such a definition might seem contradictory, because autonomy and coupling 
with the environment seem to go in different directions. However, what it is important to 
understand is that this self-transcending movement is the necessary condition of life. As 
Evan Thompson observes, “the self-transcending movement of life is none other than meta-
bolism, and metabolism is none other than the biochemical instantiation of the autopoietic 
organization. That organization must remain invariant – otherwise the organism dies – but 
the only way autopoiesis can stay in place is through the incessant material flux of meta-
bolism. In other words, the operational closure of autopoiesis demands that the organism 
be an open system” (Thompson 2009: 85). Thus, the main feature of autopoietic systems 
is that they have to change in order to be alive – total closure or homeostasis would lead 
to death. This feature is also something that is shared by second-order systems. As Cary 
Wolfe points out, “all autopoietic entities are closed (…) on the level of organization, but 
open to environmental perturbations on the level of structure” (Wolfe 1995: 53). In this 
sense, autopoietic systems are structurally open and operationally closed at the same time.
The notion of structural coupling allows one to distinguish between living and non-liv-
ing systems. If a non-living entity is disturbed by the environment, it will react according 
to a linear line of cause and effect, which is more or less predictable; if a living being is 
disturbed, it will respond with structural changes which are unpredictable (Capra, Luisi 
2014: 136). In this sense Maturana and Varela argue that structural changes which occur 
in the system are acts of cognition. A living being is capable to learn and change itself 
according to the perturbations coming from the environment. In Autopoiesis and Cogni-
tion (1980), Maturana and Varela argue that the process of cognition is coextensive with 
the process of life. “Living systems are cognitive systems, and living as a process is a 
process of cognition. This statement is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous 
system” (Maturana, Varela 1980: 13). In other words, the capacity to self-organize is seen 
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as a mental activity which can be discerned at all levels of life, from cells to human and 
non-human animals. “The interactions of a living organism – plant, animal, or human – 
with its environment are cognitive interactions. Thus life and cognition are inseparably 
connected. Mind – or, more accurately, mental activity – is immanent in matter at all 
levels of life” (Capra, Luisi 2014: 254). In this sense cognition and mind refer not only 
to beings with reflective consciousness, such as humans, but also to other living beings 
with or without brains.
Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis and cognition could be seen as a uni-
versal characteristic applicable to a larger class of organization. However, the theorists 
were reluctant to extend the concept of autopoiesis to other fields of research. As Varela 
points out, “it is tempting to confuse autopoiesis with organizational closure and living 
autonomy with autonomy in general” (Varela 1980: 37). Regardless of these restrictions, 
the system theorist Niklas Luhmann interpreted autopoiesis as a general form of system 
building by using self-referential closure, and argued that general principles of autopoietic 
organization can be applied to social systems (Luhmann 1991: 2). At the same time, the 
theory of autopoiesis was related to Gaia theory: in 1988 Lovelock, Margulis and Varela 
participated in a Gaia theory symposium in Italy, where Varela made an explicit connection 
between the self-referential system and Gaia theory. “The quality we see in Gaia as being 
living-like, to me is the fact that it is a fully autonomous system… whose fundamental 
organization corresponds to operational closure. Operational closure is a form, if you like, 
of fully self-referential network constitution that specifies its own identity. Autonomy, in 
the sense of full operational closure, is the best way of describing that living-like quality 
of Gaia, and… the use of the concept of autonomy might liberate the theory from some 
of the more animistic notions that have parasitized it” (cited in Clark 2012: 69-70).
Varela made an important observation that Gaia is not alive but living-like, thus it can 
be credited as a scientific theory and not as a New Age animistic interpretation. The next 
thing is that Varela, even being reluctant to extend the term autopoiesis to other fields, 
acknowledged that Gaia can be described in terms of autopoiesis. In this sense autopoiesis 
is understood as a general mode of systemic self-reference, which can be applied both 
to living and living-like systems. Margulis seems to take Varela’s point into account 
when she writes that “the simplest, smallest known autopoietic entity is a single bacterial 
cell. The largest is probably Gaia – life and its environment-regulating behaviour at the 
Earth’s surface. Cells and Gaia display a general property of autopoietic entities: as their 
surroundings change unpredictably, they maintain their structural integrity and internal 
organization, at the expense of solar energy, by remaking and interchanging their parts” 
(Margulis 1997: 267; 269). In this sense Margulis adopted the theory of autopoiesis and 
reframed Gaia theory in terms of autopoietic recursivity. 
Varela’s critique of Gaia theory at the 1988 symposium engendered a conceptual shift 
from first-order cybernetics to second-order cybernetics, from homeostatic regulation 
to autopoietic recursivity (Clarke 2012: 71). Similarly, Onori and Visconti agreed that, 
influenced by Margulis’ investigations into autopoietic systems, Gaia theory moved to 
second-order cybernetics (Onori, Visconti 2012: 381). First-order cybernetics refers to 
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operational circularity in natural and technological systems, whereas second-order cyber-
netics turns the logic of operational circularity upon itself. As Clarke asserts, “first-order 
cybernetics is hetero-referential, it concerns ‘objects’ such as natural and technological 
systems. Second-order cybernetics observes the self-reference of ‘subjects’, that is, the 
necessary recursivity of cognitive systems capable of producing observations in the first 
place” (Clarke 2012: 59). In this respect, second-order systems, from cells to Gaia, are 
not only observed but also observing, in other words, they have the capacity for learning 
and cognition. Thus, according to Clarke, “the Gaia hypothesis began as a thought ex-
periment drawing on homeostasis, a basic first-order cybernetic model of self-regulation 
using negative feedback to correct deviations from a desired state of operation” (2017: 15). 
However, with the inclusion of autopoiesis, Gaia discourse was remodelled according to 
second-order systems theory which turned the logic of operational circularity upon itself 
and thus implied the notion of cognition. 
Gaia and Actor Network Theory 
Another important reconceptualization of Gaia theory is presented in Latour’s Facing Gaia: 
Eight Lectures on the New Climatic Regime (2017a). Here Latour distances himself from 
cybernetic discourse and prefers to investigate Gaia in terms of his own Actor Network 
Theory (Latour 2005). First, Latour argues that Gaia is not a totality, a whole which is 
made of parts. The part-whole distinction is applicable only to technological systems, 
whereas Gaia is not a technology or a machine. Latour asserts that “as Gaia cannot be 
compared to a machine, it cannot be subjected to any sort of re-engineering” (Latour 2017a: 
96-97). The components could be defined as parts existing in relation to the whole only 
on a dead planet; however, the Earth is alive, therefore such a distinction is not possible. 
Second, Gaia is not a totality in terms of a superorganism. Latour points out that “all the 
sciences, natural or social, are haunted by the specter of the ‘organism’, which always 
becomes, more or less surreptitiously, a ‘superorganism’ – that is, a dispatcher to whom 
the task – or rather the holy mystery – of successfully coordinating the various parts is 
attributed” (Latour 2017a: 95). What Latour finds problematic here is not the concept of 
organism but an organism understood as a whole determining its parts. 
Thus, instead of conceptualizing Gaia in terms of a totality, understood either as a 
machine or an organism, Latour prefers to define it in terms of agency and an agent which 
is involved in different interactions. Margulis’s investigations into the kingdom of microor-
ganisms, similar to those conducted by Louis Pasteur, reveals that the Earth is composed 
of invisible agents which can manipulate mountain formations, cloud layers, and even the 
movement of tectonic plates. As Latour points out, “the Earth’s behavior is inexplicable 
without the addition of the work accomplished by living organisms, just as fermentation, 
for Pasteur, cannot be started without yeast. Just as the action of micro-organisms, in the 
nineteenth century, agitated beer, wine, vinegar, milk, and epidemics, from now on the 
incessant action of organisms succeeds in setting in motion air, water, soil, and, proceeding 
from one thing to another, the entire climate” (Latour 2017a: 93). Latour interprets Gaia 
ISSN 1392-1126   eISSN 2424-6158   PROBLEMOS 98, 2020
148
as the network of agents where each agent is trying to manipulate the environment for 
its own interest. In this respect both human and nonhuman agents are equally involved 
into the attempts to change the environment around them. In this respect, humans have 
no exceptional qualities, because “the capacity of humans to rearrange everything around 
themselves is a general property of living things” (Latour 2017a: 99). In other words, both 
human and nonhuman agents express a certain intentionality and create an entire network of 
effects and connections. What is important for Latour is how to keep connectivity without 
being holistic (Latour 2017b: 75), how to avoid reducing these connections into a single 
acting totality, or a whole. In this sense Latour, going against the grain of Lovelock and 
Margulis’s orientation towards systems theory, argues that Gaia is anti-systemic: “Gaia, 
the outlaw, is the anti-system” (Latour 2017a: 87). However, as Clarke points out, it is 
important not to conflate the notion of “whole” with that of “system” (Clarke 2017: 14). 
If something does not make a whole, it doesn’t mean that it cannot be a system. 
Latour associates this anti-systemic character of Gaia with Isabelle Stengers’s inter-
pretation of Gaia. As Stengers points out, Gaia exists on its own terms: “It is not a living 
being, and not a cybernetic one either; rather it is a being demanding that we complicate the 
divide between life and non-life, for Gaia is gifted with its own particular way of holding 
together and of answering to changes forced on it (…), thus breaking the general linear 
relation between causes and effects” (Stengers 2015b: 137; cited in Clarke 2017: 14). In her 
In Catastrophic Times: Resisting the Coming Barbarism (2015a), Stengers describes Gaia 
as an intruder which is incompatible with our expectations and conceptualizations. Gaia is 
“a ticklish assemblage of forces” that is absolutely transcendent in relation to our reasons 
and projects. “The intrusion of this type of transcendence, which I am calling Gaia, makes 
a major unknown, which is here to stay, exist at the heart of our lives. This is perhaps most 
difficult to conceptualize: no future can be foreseen in which she will give back to us the 
liberty of ignoring her” (Stengers 2015a: 47). Defined in this way, Gaia is intrusive, ticklish, 
and unforeseen, ready to destroy our human order. This radically unknown and unforeseen 
character of Gaia can be traced to Stengers’s collaboration with Ilya Prigogine (Prigogine, 
Stengers 1984) and her theoretical background in far from equilibrium systems theory. 
Interpreting Gaia from this point of view, we can recognize some contours of dissipative 
structures. Dissipative structures not only maintain themselves in a state far from equilibrium 
but may evolve into more complex structures (Capra, Luisi 2014: 159). In this regard Gaia 
the intruder, even being chaotic and unforeseen, may evolve into a new complex order and 
in this sense is compatible with systems theory. Clarke comes to a similar conclusion when 
he asserts that “the Gaia discourses of Stengers and Latour may be positively aligned with 
the systems theory that supports Lynn Margulis’s autopoietic Gaia concept” and that “in 
both cases, their efforts to evade the cybernetics of Gaia simply reconstitute the systemic 
description they reject” (Clarke 2017: 7).
Cary Wolfe (2020) provides a less sympathetic reading of Latour’s Facing Gaia and his 
attempts to shape Gaia in terms of Actor Network Theory. According to Wolfe, the main 
problem in Latour’s theory is the insufficient understanding of the difference between a 
first-order and second order systems theory. “A crucial underlying problem, (…) is that 
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Latour continues to understand the terms ‘system’ and ‘autopoiesis’ as if they were simply 
synonyms for homeostasis and command-and-control, and the fingerprints of this misun-
derstanding in Facing Gaia are all over his use of the term ‘cybernetics’” (Wolfe 2020: 
140). It seems that Latour understands cybernetics as based on “mereological” relations 
between parts and wholes, and, as Wolfe points out, “Latour cannot understand that, in 
second-order systems theory, the account of the relationship between the ‘part’ and the 
‘whole’ (…) is actually the opposite of the caricature he offers here” (Wolfe 2020: 140). 
Latour’s critique of cybernetics and systems theory misses the target because second-order 
cybernetics reconceptualises the notion of the system in such a way that it incorporates 
recursivity and contingency (Hui 2019).
Another problem appears when Latour is trying to explain the interaction between 
the “inside” and the “outside”, or between an organism and its environment: on the 
one hand, he asserts that the borders are subverted, on the other hand, he describes the 
“waves of action”, where an agent is manipulating its neighbours, and these neighbours 
are manipulating it in return (Latour 2017a: 101). What Latour describes as “manipula-
tion” or “intention” and attributes to the sporadic actions of agents, is nothing other than 
the contingent nature of autopoietic second-order systems. According to Wolfe, “What 
Latour is unable to theorize here is the relationship (…) between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, 
‘neighbor’ and ‘environment,’ because he doesn’t grasp the key insight of second-order 
systems theory and the theory of autopoiesis: that the contingency of the self-reference 
of autopoietic organisms is the ‘wild card,’ the ‘outlaw,’ at the core of everything La-
tour wants from the unpredictable ‘agency’ and ‘intentions’…” (Wolfe 2020: 141). The 
contingent character of interactions arises not from the agent’s intentions, but from the 
self-referential character of autopoietic systems which include contingency within them-
selves. Self-referential closure and contingency do not contradict each other because 
the same system can be closed at an organizational level and open at an environmental 
level. As Luhmann points out, self-referential closure “does not contradict the system’s 
openness to the environment. Instead, in the self-referential mode of operation, closure is 
a form of broadening possible environmental contacts; closure increases, by constituting 
elements more capable of being determined, the complexity of the environment that is 
possible for the system” (Luhmann 1995: 37). In second-order systems recursivity works 
in such a way that, by incorporating contingency, it makes the system more complex. 
This contingency explains the “anti-systemic” and “outlaw” character of Gaia, and this 
is what Latour’s theory fails to explain. 
Another important point of critique is that the notion of “agent” or “actant” fails to 
maintain the difference between living and non-living (physical) systems. As Wolfe points 
out, “the alterity, ‘creativity’, and ‘outlaw’ relations that obtain among what Latour calls 
‘actants’ are (…) much more unruly and unpredictable among biological life forms and 
their environmental relations than between, say, stones or vacuum cleaners” (Wolfe 2020: 
143). In this respect Latour’s Actor Network Theory flattens the distinction between 
living and non-living systems and different orders of causality that these systems imply. 
Living organisms imply a different order of causality, which incorporate recursivity and 
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contingency and allow them to change themselves and their environment. Recursivity 
in second-order systems is the source of internal transformation, and this is the main 
characteristic of living organisms. The difference between living and non-living systems 
is crucial if we want to understand the functioning of Gaia and the interface between 
physical, biological, and social systems. 
Gaia and the Theory of Sympoiesis
A different take on Gaia appears in Donna Haraway’s Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin 
in the Chthulucene (2016). Haraway seems sympathetic to Latour’s and Stenger’s theories 
of Gaia (although omitting their different backgrounds) and reads them as a continuation of 
Lovelock and Margulis’s hypothesis: “[i]n this hypothesis, Gaia is autopoietic – self-form-
ing, boundary maintaining, contingent, dynamic and stable under some conditions but not 
others. Gaia is not reducible to the sum of its parts, but achieves finite systemic coherence 
in the face of perturbations within parameters that are themselves responsive to dynamic 
systemic processes” (Haraway 2016: 43-44). Haraway is also sympathetic to Margulis’s 
idea that life emerges through symbiosis and symbiogenesis, which leads to the increasing 
complexity of life forms. However, Haraway questions the underlying assumption that 
these emerging life forms are autopoietic and argues that Margulis perhaps “would have 
chosen the term sympoietic, but the word and concept had not yet surfaced” (Haraway 
2016: 61). Haraway argues that nothing can really create itself. Therefore nothing is really 
autopoietic but needs other organisms and environments to become what it is. In this 
regard the theory of autopoiesis should be coupled with the theory of sympoiesis, which 
refers not to autonomous but to collectively produced systems. 
Haraway takes the term of sympoiesis from Beth Dempster’s (2000) work, where 
she makes a distinction between sympoietic and autopoietic systems. Autopoietic sys-
tems, as defined by Maturana and Varela, are characterized by two basic features: first, 
they produce relations between their components that allow them to reproduce the same 
pattern of relations (they are self-referential); second, they have the ability to reproduce 
their own boundaries (they are self-defining). Autopoietic systems are organizationally 
closed, but structurally open: this means that they are not absolutely autonomous but that 
they internally define their boundaries and relationships with the environment. Sympoietic 
systems are organizationally ajar, with loosely defined boundaries. “Lacking self-defined 
boundaries, sympoietic systems consequently lack the same degree of control and are open 
to a continual flux of organizationally relevant information. (…) This dynamic, though 
restricted, flux of information allows sympoietic systems to evolve continuously by adapt-
ing to changing conditions and by generating new ones” (Dempster 2000: 9). Autopoietic 
and sympoietic systems manage information in different ways: autopoietic systems carry 
a kind of “packaged” information, whereas sympoietic systems carry different bits of 
information in their components (which are autopoietic in themselves) and lack a central 
control. This makes sympoietic systems more flexible and adaptive, in the sense that they 
can easily adapt to changing environments, and also create something new, produce new 
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forms of organization (in this regard they are allopoietic): “autopoietic systems follow 
some sort of path from a less to a more developed stage, whereas sympoietic systems are 
continually, although not necessarily consistently, changing” (Dempster 2000: 10-11). 
This explains why sympoietic systems have bigger potential for change: if autopoietic 
systems are homeostatic, predictable and development-oriented, then sympoietic systems 
are allopoietic (producing otherness), unpredictable, and evolutionary oriented. In this 
sense sympoietic systems, which also include autopoietic systems as their components, 
have the ability to maintain their identity and the status quo, and, at the same time, have 
the potential to create changes and to adapt to changes coming from the environment. 
Haraway adopts the theory of sympoiesis and suggests that “Gaia is a system mistaken 
for autopoietic that is really sympoietic” (Haraway 2016: 180, n 38). We can add that 
autopoiesis explains the functioning of bounded units or individuals, whereas sympoiesis 
is a term to explain the collaborative assemblages which acquire their identity in the 
process of interaction and becoming. By fusing different components, sympoiesis creates 
more complex life forms and gives rise to new emergent properties. Haraway refers to 
Margulis’s notion of the holobiont, which indicates an organism plus persisting symbionts. 
A good example of such a holobiont is Mixotricha paradoxa, a critter that lives in the gut 
of an Australian termite and helps it to digest cellulose. Mixotricha paradoxa looks like a 
single-celled critter, but after a closer examination it seems to consist of multiple bacterial 
symbionts. Margulis and Sagan (2001) described it as a “beast with five genomes”: it is a 
composite organism containing a protist and at least four different types of bacteria. For 
Haraway, the notion of holobiont questions the idea of a self-organized individual and 
indicates that all living beings are dynamic organizing processes: “Like Margulis, I use 
holobiont to mean symbiotic assemblages, at whatever scale of space and time, which are 
more like knots of diverse intra-active relatings in dynamic complex systems, than like 
the entities in a biology made up of preexisting bounded units (genes, cells, organisms, 
etc.) in interactions that can only be conceived as competitive or cooperative” (Haraway 
2016: 60). Haraway does not specify what these “dynamic complex systems” mean but 
it is clear from her description that they preclude any existence of bounded individuals. 
The notion of the holobiont changes not only our understanding of the bacterial world 
but also the idea of what it means to be human. As Scott Gilbert points out, “the holobiont 
is powerful, in part, because it is not limited to nonhuman organisms. It also changes what 
it means to be a person” (Gilbert 2017: 75). Seen from this perspective, the human body 
is not a bounded individual but a complex ecosystem, which is related to other organisms 
through the reciprocal process of sympoiesis. For example, in defining anatomical indi-
viduality, Gilbert suggests that only about half the cells in our bodies contain a “human 
genome,” and other cells include about 160 different bacterial genomes (Gilbert 2017: 75). 
Thus, according to genetic and anatomical criteria, we are far from individuals because 
our microbiome can be considered as a supplementary organ. From the immunological 
point of view, humans are also far from individuals because our immune system allows 
countless microbes to become parts of our bodies. As Gilbert points out, “without the 
proper microbial symbionts, important subsets of immune cells fail to form. (…) We are 
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thus not individuals by immune criteria” (Gilbert 2017: 82). After discussing anatomical, 
genetic, developmental, physiological, immune, and evolutionary criteria, Gilbert comes 
to the conclusion that we are not individuals but holobionts – organisms persistently co-
operating with communities of symbionts. This means that symbiosis is not a marginal 
or random case but an all-encompassing principle of life. “These major symbiotic webs 
rule the planet, and within these big symbioses are the smaller symbiotic webs of things 
we call organisms. (…) Symbiosis is the way of life on earth; we are all holobionts by 
birth” (Gilbert 2017: 84). 
Haraway takes the notion of holobiont even further by decentralizing the relation-
ships between a host and its symbionts: “my use of holobiont does not designate host + 
symbionts because all of the players are symbionts to each other, in diverse kinds of re-
lationalities and with varying degrees of openness to attachments and assemblages with 
other holobionts” (Hawaway 2016: 60). In this sense sympoietic systems embrace both 
operational closure, as described by Luhmann, and operational openness. For Luhmann 
the system’s autopoiesis makes the components more determined and defined, and this 
leads the system to a certain evolutionary shift to a higher complexity. As was discussed, 
Luhmann asserts that autopoietic closure does not contradict the system’s openness to 
the environment. However, the notion of sympoiesis allows us to conceptualize not the 
“openness from closure principle”, as Wolfe (2010) has phrased it, but “operational 
openness”, which means dynamic and complex interactions between different systems. 
Although on certain occasions Haraway expressed her resistance to systems theories of 
all kinds (Gane 2006), I argue that her notion of sympoiesis might be seen as a major 
reconceptualization of systems theory.
Thus Latour, Stengers, and Haraway invite us to rethink Gaia not as an autopoietic 
unity, closed onto itself in repetitive patterns, but as a complex and dynamic system, which 
is open to contingency and otherness. The theory of sympoiesis, proposed by Haraway, 
questions the notion of bounded individuals and allows us to rethink living beings (both 
human and nonhuman) as open systems. In this regard the theory of sympoiesis questions 
the principle of closure defining autopoietic systems and asserts operational openness. On 
the one hand, every individual needs to have boundaries to remain what it is; on the other 
hand, total enclosure within these boundaries means the repetition of the same that leads 
to death. To be alive we need to change, to give up our individuality, and to connect to 
different networks of symbionts. In this sense, the notion of autopoiesis should be rethought 
as allopoiesis or heteropoiesis that constantly produces otherness and is connected with 
something other than itself. 
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